[HECnet] 108.31.82.9/QCOCAL
Brian Schenkenberger, VAXman-
system at TMESIS.COM
Mon Jun 20 10:30:34 PDT 2016
Johnny Billquist <bqt at softjar.se> writes:
>On 2016-06-20 18:19, Brian Schenkenberger, VAXman- wrote:
>> ___ _ _ _ __ __ _ _ _ _ ___ _____
>> / __| /_\ | \| | \ \ / / /_\ | | | \| | | __| |_ _|
>> \__ \ / _ \ | .` | \ V / / _ \ | |__ | .` | | _| | |
>> |___/ /_/_\_\_|_|\_| |_| /_/ \_\ |____| |_|\_| |___|_ |_|
>>
>> You've allowed this node on HECnet, so I assume somebody on this list knows
>> who runs it.
>
>Who runs it can always easily be found by http://mim.update.uu.se/nodedb
>
>> Please have it secured! It has been used in the past several
>> days to try and break into my system(s). It is highly irresponsible to put
>> access credentials into its SYS$ANNOUNCE allowing ANYBODY access to DCL and
>> other utilities that can affect systems on the internet. A reasonable way
>> to allow access would be to have a guest account (restricted/captive) that
>> can be used to create other login accounts. Validate such accounts with a
>> valid email address and other schemes that will insure that whomever is on
>> this system can be vetted in some fashion.
>>
>> THANK YOU!
>
>I'm curious about what kind of intrusions we're talking about, and over
>which network.
>
>In general, I want to keep HECnet more open than what you are suggesting
>above, but this also requires that people act responsibly. If there is
>abuse, I'd like to know.
Well, since I have not yet put any of my systems on HECnet, it should have
been obvious that it's via the internet.
--
VAXman- A Bored Certified VMS Kernel Mode Hacker VAXman(at)TMESIS(dot)ORG
I speak to machines with the voice of humanity.
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