[HECnet] 108.31.82.9/QCOCAL

Brian Schenkenberger, VAXman- system at TMESIS.COM
Mon Jun 20 10:30:34 PDT 2016


Johnny Billquist <bqt at softjar.se> writes:

>On 2016-06-20 18:19, Brian Schenkenberger, VAXman- wrote:
>>   ___     _     _  _  __   __    _     _      _  _   ___   _____
>>  / __|   /_\   | \| | \ \ / /   /_\   | |    | \| | | __| |_   _|
>>  \__ \  / _ \  | .` |  \ V /   / _ \  | |__  | .` | | _|    | |
>>  |___/ /_/_\_\_|_|\_|   |_|   /_/ \_\ |____| |_|\_| |___|_  |_|
>>
>> You've allowed this node on HECnet, so I assume somebody on this list knows
>> who runs it.
>
>Who runs it can always easily be found by http://mim.update.uu.se/nodedb
>
>>  Please have it secured!  It has been used in the past several
>> days to try and break into my system(s).  It is highly irresponsible to put
>> access credentials into its SYS$ANNOUNCE allowing ANYBODY access to DCL and
>> other utilities that can affect systems on the internet.  A reasonable way
>> to allow access would be to have a guest account (restricted/captive) that
>> can be used to create other login accounts.  Validate such accounts with a
>> valid email address and other schemes that will insure that whomever is on
>> this system can be vetted in some fashion.
>>
>> THANK YOU!
>
>I'm curious about what kind of intrusions we're talking about, and over 
>which network.
>
>In general, I want to keep HECnet more open than what you are suggesting 
>above, but this also requires that people act responsibly. If there is 
>abuse, I'd like to know.

Well, since I have not yet put any of my systems on HECnet, it should have 
been obvious that it's via the internet.

-- 
VAXman- A Bored Certified VMS Kernel Mode Hacker    VAXman(at)TMESIS(dot)ORG

I speak to machines with the voice of humanity.


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